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WHAT DID THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
ORIGINALLY MEAN?
The founders’ understanding of the concept of rights
would leave them confused by how we make decisions
about freedom of speech today.
By Jud C ampbell
Illustrations by Robert Meganck

T

he First Amendment says that “Congress
shall make no law … abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press.” For Americans,
this language is familiar. But what exactly
does it mean? How far do the speech and
press clauses restrict governmental power?
The founders, as we will see, answered these questions very differently than we typically do today.
And the reasons why highlight fundamental shifts
in American constitutional thought.
At first glance, the text of the speech and press
clauses might appear to prevent Congress from
imposing any restrictions on expression. But this
reading can’t be right, and it never has been. Every
well-functioning government needs to restrict at
least some speech. Laws against committing perjury, disclosing classified information, and making
terrorist threats, for instance, all restrict “speech,”
but no one seriously doubts their constitutionality.
In any event, the First Amendment says only that

Congress cannot abridge “the freedom of ” speech or
the press; it doesn’t say that Congress cannot restrict
speech or the press at all. By itself, the text is unclear.
When faced with opaque features of our
Constitution, judges and legal scholars often look for
what those provisions meant when they were enacted.
Nowadays, we typically associate this approach with
political conservatism, and particularly the claims
of many self-proclaimed “originalists” who aim to
interpret the Constitution according to its “original
meaning.” But the truth is that virtually everyone
puts enormous weight on history. The Supreme Court
has the power only to interpret the Constitution, not
the power to change it, so arguments about original
meaning have always had special force.
With only peripheral exceptions, however, modern judicial decisions about expressive freedom do
not consider original meaning at all. For jurists of
all stripes, interpreting the First Amendment is a
historical dead zone.
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But why? The most straightforward reason,
it seems, is that nobody knows what the First
Amendment originally meant. As leading First
Amendment scholar (and former dean of Richmond
Law) Rodney Smolla puts it, “One can keep going
round and round on the original meaning of the
First Amendment, but no clear, consistent vision of
what the framers meant by freedom of speech will
ever emerge.” A quick look at the history reinforces
Smolla’s point. Only a decade after the Constitution
went into effect, Americans vehemently disagreed
over whether Congress could pass the Sedition Act
of 1798, which banned false and malicious criticisms
of the federal government. If the founders couldn’t
even agree among themselves about that type of law,
then surely looking for the First Amendment’s “original meaning” is like searching for the Holy Grail.

understood their “rights” in a very different way.
For the founders, rights were divided into two categories: natural rights and positive rights. Unless
we approach the task of constitutional interpretation on their terms rather than on ours, the First
Amendment’s original meaning will remain elusive.
Natural rights were all the things that we could
do simply as humans, without the intervention of a
government. As Thomas Paine once put it, “A natural right is an animal right, and the power to act it,
is supposed … to be mechanically contained within
ourselves as individuals.” Eating, walking, thinking,
and praying, for instance, were all things that individuals could do without a government, so they were
all easily identifiable as natural rights.
Meanwhile, positive rights were defined explicitly
in terms in governmental authority. The right to
a jury trial and the right to
habeas corpus, for instance,
were positive rights because
they were procedures provided by the government.
With these definitions in
view, the founders had no
need to write out long lists
of which types of rights were
natural and which were positive. The distinction, to
them, was obvious. Speaking,
writing, and publishing, for
instance, were all things that people could do without a government, so they were readily recognizable
as natural rights. When James Madison introduced
the Bill of Rights in the first Congress, for instance,
he only mentioned in passing that freedom of
speech was one of the “natural rights, retained.”
Madison’s audience easily understood his point.
Expression is an innate human capacity, so it is a
natural right.
But we still haven’t quite arrived at the original meaning of the speech and press clauses. For
that, we need to understand how natural rights
constrained governmental power. Surely the First
Amendment imposes some limits on Congress. (It
says, after all, that “Congress shall make no law …
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”)
What were those limits?
For the founders, natural rights were rooted in a
philosophical system called social-contract theory.
According to this theory, the proper scope of governmental authority is discoverable by first imagining
our situation as if there were no government and
then considering why we would come together and
agree to form a political society through an agree-

‘… natural rights were not a set of determinate
legal privileges or immunities that the government
could not abridge. Natural rights, it bears emphasis,
could be restricted by law to promote the good
of the society.’
But perhaps we have framed the question in
entirely the wrong way, seeing hopeless confusion
where the founders would have perceived a more
ordered disagreement. Of course, attitudes toward
speech and press freedoms were not uniform.
Constitutional disagreements were commonplace
back then, just as they are today. But maybe there
was an order to the chaos in a way that we haven’t
previously appreciated.
The key to understanding the original meanings
of the speech and press clauses is to step back from
a search for the meaning of particular rights and
instead try to appreciate how the founders thought
about rights more generally. In other words, we’ve
been focused on discerning an image in a single
puzzle piece rather than looking for its place in a
broader puzzle.
For us, a constitutional “right” is a legally enforceable privilege or immunity — something that the
government has to provide us (e.g., our “right” to a
jury trial) or something that the government cannot
take away (e.g., our “right” to possess personal firearms for self-defense).
But American elites in the late 18th century
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ment known as a social contract. The political society would then agree to a constitution that created a
government and granted it certain powers.
Although some ancillary features of social-contract theory were contested, virtually every
American political leader in the late 18th century
agreed about its core features. Most importantly,
the founders recognized two crucial limitations
that social-contract theory imposes on governmental power to restrict natural rights. First, natural
rights can be restricted only when the people themselves consent to the restriction, either in person or
through their political representatives. This principle was a rallying cry for American colonists advocating for independence rather than submitting to
British taxation when they had no representation in

were, therefore, beyond the scope of legislative
power. The famous “rule against prior restraints” —
prohibiting the government from requiring preapproval of publications — is one example. Another is
that well-intentioned criticisms of the government
could not be punished. (Deliberate efforts to mislead the public were an entirely different matter.)
The First Amendment thus prevented temporary
legislative majorities from abandoning these settled
principles.
How much further the speech and press clauses
went, though, was up for debate precisely because
the founders often disagreed about exactly what
restrictions of expression promoted the public good.
This conflict was especially clear in the late 1790s as
Americans clashed over the constitutionality of the

Parliament. Second, the government could restrict
natural rights only when doing so promoted the
public good — that is, the aggregate happiness and
welfare of the entire political society. Individuals
entering a political society, John Locke explained
in his widely read Second Treatise, surrender “as
much … natural Liberty … as the Good, Prosperity,
and Safety of the Society shall require.”
As a general matter, therefore, the concept of natural rights helped define who could restrict individual liberty (namely, a representative legislature) and
why they could do so (namely, to promote the public
good). But natural rights were not a set of determinate legal privileges or immunities that the government could not abridge. Natural rights,
it bears emphasis, could be restricted
by law to promote the good of the
society. “[T]he right to speak and
act,” American patriot James Otis
explained at the onset of the colonial conflict, “is limited by the
law — Political liberty consists
in a freedom of speech and
action, so far as the laws of a
community will permit, and
no farther.” Effectively, this put
the legislature — not judges —
in primary control over how
far to restrict expression. The
freedoms of speech and of the
press, in other words, were a
primarily philosophical concept — not a strictly legal one.
At the same time, the
founders also appreciated
that certain regulations
of speech were not in
the public interest and

federal Sedition Act.
Members of the Federalist Party — the party of
President John Adams — argued that maintaining
a republican government required punishing those
who falsely and maliciously criticized the government. “[E]very individual is at liberty to expose, in
the strongest terms, consistent with decency and
truth all the errors of any department of the government,” Federalist jurist Alexander Addison wrote.
But this hardly implied constitutional protection
for deliberately misleading the public. “Because the
Constitution guaranties the right of expressing our
opinions, and the freedom of the
press,” Federalist congressman
John Allen asked rhetorically,
“am I at liberty to falsely call
you a thief, a murderer, an
atheist?” Stopping the spread
of lies, Federalists insisted, was
essential to maintaining a well-informed electorate and, thus, a republican government.
In response, Jeffersonian-Republican
opponents of the Sedition Act did not
even try to defend the notion that all
speech is beneficial. “It may perhaps be
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urged, and plausibly urged, that the welfare of the
community may sometimes, and in some cases,
require certain restrictions on [an] unlimited right
of enquiry,” Elizabeth Ryland Priestley wrote. The
problem for Republicans, however, was the prospect
of governmental abuses of power. Authority to punish sedition, Priestley explained, “once conceded,
may be extended to every [opinion] which insidious
despotism may think fit to hold out as dangerous.”
In other words, Republicans still assessed questions
of free speech in terms of the public good — the
core principle set out by the First Amendment —
but Republicans were worried that Federalists were
pursuing their own narrow partisan interests rather
than the general welfare and that these abuses of
power would stifle useful public debate.
In sum, the founders thought that the First
Amendment required Congress to restrict speech
and the press only in promotion of the public good,
while also guaranteeing more specific legal rules
that had long protected expressive freedom. The
amendment, in other words, stood for a general
principle — one that left room for considerable
debate about how it should be applied in practice —
and also for the entrenchment of more specific settled principles. The speech and press clauses thus
shaped debate about expressive freedom while also
standing as bulwarks against constitutional backsliding. The amendment was not simply a counter-majoritarian limit on legislative power. However,
once the people agreed on core features of expressive freedom, the legislature could not turn back.
This process of accumulating and refining constitutional principles over time through political means
is foreign to us. Rights in the modern sense are counter-majoritarian limits on legislative power, so it seems
strange that their scope could somehow depend on
political decisions. For us, judges have that job.
For people born and raised in the tradition of the
customary British constitution, however, the logic
of recognizing constitutional limits through political rather than judicial means makes perfect sense.
“[C]ustomary law carries with it the most unquestionable proofs of freedom,” explained James Wilson, a
delegate to the Constitutional Convention and later
Supreme Court justice. Politicians do abuse power,
of course. But for the founders, once legislators agree
on a constitutional principle, and once that settlement remains in place for some time, the principle
becomes binding. “[L]ong and uniform custom,”
English jurist Richard Wooddeson noted in 1792,
“bestows a sanction, as evidence of universal approbation and acquiescence.” It was, in other words, as
if the people themselves had spoken.
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For the drafters of the Bill of Rights, the First
Amendment fit within this familiar tradition. Wellestablished principles about expressive freedom
would limit Congress, and judges and juries could
enforce these settled boundaries of governmental
authority. But, otherwise, the First Amendment
would leave the task of defining the public good to
the people and their representatives. For the founders, judges could not create new limits on governmental authority. That development came a century
and a half later as the Supreme Court began to strike
down state and federal restrictions of speech in the
1930s. The vision embraced by the justices was still
evolutionary — recognizing new constitutional principles over time. But going forward, courts, rather
than legislatures, assumed primary responsibility
for determining the scope of constitutionally enumerated natural rights.
This is when we began to lose touch with this part
of our constitutional past. The rights recognized in
the Bill of Rights all started looking the same, without distinctions between natural rights and positive
rights. All of these rights, in turn, became trump
cards that individuals began to play against legislative claims to the common good. Political settlements no longer mattered; judges were now supreme
exponents of the Constitution. Questions of policy
— questions about what types of laws promoted the
general welfare — transformed into an abstruse web
of legal doctrines. Rather that promoting engaged
civil debate in the political sphere, invoking “rights”
is now a way of shutting that debate down.
Perhaps the way the founders understood the
First Amendment is ill-suited for our modern world,
where distrust and disdain for politics constantly seems to reach new heights. From abortion
restrictions to gun-control laws to limits on speech,
Americans by and large look to courts, rather than
to ourselves and our political representatives, to
define and protect our rights. Constitutionally
speaking, we live in a different world. Perhaps we
can’t or shouldn’t go back. But at the very least,
history can help open our minds to new ways of
thinking and help us appreciate the foreignness of
our constitutional past.
Rights were not always claims against the public
good, and judges were not always the ones who
decided their full scope. Where we go from here is
up to us. ■

Jud Campbell is an assistant professor at University of
Richmond School of Law.

